Availability is very important for long-term use of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), assuming the presence of an attacker. It is thus important to achieve secure communication among WSNs even if some sensor nodes are compromised. Self-healing WSNs possess the feature that a network automatically self-heals after nodecapture attacks in order to achieve availability. The self-healing means that the ratio of compromised links decreases with time, even if the attacker corrupts sensor nodes of the network. In this paper, three kinds of self-healing schemes for WSNs are described, a polynomial-based self-healing scheme, a simple random key pre-distribution scheme with self-healing, and a proactive co-operative link self-healing scheme. Our contributions are the self-healing schemes with security evaluation, in which we conduct analytical evaluation and a simulation experiment of our schemes, and results obtained from both analysis and simulations indicate that our schemes are effective in self-healing. Furthermore, comparing three schemes, we clarify each difference and discuss optimal scheme under each different environments.
INTRODUCTION

Background
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are commonly used for military, smart homes, intelligent environments, and ubiquitous applications. The primary aim of WSNs is to sense some events and carry these sensor data to a base station. When the WSNs are deployed in hostile areas, sensor nodes can be captured by adversaries, and then information about the network is taken from the captured nodes, because a node has no tamper-resistant hardware. It is thus important to decrease the links compromised by node capture attacks. We describe an RKP (random key pre-distribution) scheme and self-healing WSNs in the following paragraphs.
Wireless sensor networks consist of small, battery-operated, limited memory, and limited computational power sensor nodes. Hence, most existing schemes in WSNs are based on symmetric key cryptography. One of the most popular schemes, referred to as RKP in this paper, was firstly proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [1] . In this scheme, each node is configured with a key ring of m sub-keys. These keys are randomly drawn from the large key pool of P sub-keys. Two nodes establish their symmetric key from the sub-keys they have in common in their key ring. However, the security of the whole network in RKP degrades over time in hostile areas. An attacker who corrupts several nodes can partially reconstruct, from key rings of the compromised nodes, the key pool of Figure 1 . Map of our schemes. S-RKP, simple random key pre-distribution scheme with self-healing; RPoK, polynomial-based self-healing scheme; POLISH, proactive co-operative link self-healing.
RoK scheme [2] . As a result, RPoK is suitable in situations where higher resiliency is required such as a more hostile area.
S-RKP[15]
is a simple RKP scheme with self-healing for WSNs, without lightweight operations such as a hash function. S-RKP can enhance the RKP with self-healing property, without changing the functions of sensors. This means that S-RKP is suitable for WSNs that use resource-poor sensors. 3. POLISH [16] is the first proactive co-operative link self-healing scheme, without the help of a server. POLISH is suitable for the situations where 100% secure connectivity is required and the size of memory is quite efficient in POLISH, because it is a deterministic key-sharing scheme. POLISH can also keep higher resiliency without the help of a server, where the sensor operates independently. Hence, POLISH is suitable for WSNs where the key management is not necessary by a server.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we provide some preliminaries. We explain our protocols in detail in Section 3, analyze its security in Sections 4 and 5, and discuss security and efficiency of our schemes in Section 6. We finally conclude this paper in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation
We use the common notations in Table I .
Requirements
The following requirements need to be considered when designing a self-healing scheme in WSNs.
Highly secure connectivity: After deployment, two nodes share a key to establish a secure link. A probabilistic key-sharing scheme is required to keep the probability of key sharing high. This probability is called a secure connectivity. Actually, in the RKP schemes, a secure connectivity becomes almost 100% by adjusting P and m. Self-healing: Sensor nodes may be deployed in public or hostile locations in many applications. We assume that the adversary can mount a physical attack on a sensor node after it has been deployed and read secret information from its memory. Therefore, a self-healing property is very important for long-term use of WSNs. Self-healing means that the compromised links are automatically healed with time even if the adversary corrupts the sensor nodes of the network. The degree of self-healing is measured by resiliency. Resiliency is estimated by the ratio of links, which has not been compromised by the capture of nodes. Self-healing is achieved by security Set of green, yellow, and red sensors at round r GL r , RL r Set of green and red links at round r properties: forward and backward security. These security properties are defined in [13] . Forward secrecy means that adversary cannot learn any keys used to decrypt and/or authenticate before compromise, and backward secrecy means that adversary cannot learn any keys used to decrypt and/or authenticate after compromise.
Restricted resources: It is required that WSNs consist of small, battery-operated devices with limited memory and limited computational power. It is also desirable that we do not use even lightweight operations on a sensor, such as a hash function.
Attacker model
The main purpose of attacker is to steal as many keys in each node as possible in order to compromise a secure link. We assume eager attackers described in [2] . This type of attacker regularly corrupts nodes of the network without stopping operations. More concretely, the eager attacker keeps compromising nodes at a constant rate, from the deployment of the first round of sensors to the end of the life of the network. Attacker knows the entire topology of the WSNs and can create a table of sensor secrets and share them. Attacker does not stay at one local place for stealthy operation and then does not interfere with sensor's behavior, that is, it does not delete, delay, or introduce messages.
Multiphase wireless sensor networks
Multiphase WSNs: A multiphase WSN is a network where a sensor is replaced with the server's help after its battery has been depleted. More concretely, sensor nodes that run out of power will be removed from the network, and new sensor nodes need to be periodically deployed to assure network connectivity. Note that a multiphase WSN does not always have self-healing property. Resilient multiphase WSNs: A resilient multiphase WSN possesses the feature that the network automatically self-heals against node-capture attack. The key pool refreshes over time in resilient multiphase WSNs, and hence the pre-distributed keys have limited lifetimes. The key ring also refreshes over time. This implies that each sensor gradually stops using the old sub-keys.
Probability of pairwise key sharing
In the RKP schemes [1, 8] , a pairwise key is stochastically constructed. The probability that two nodes share i sub-keys is defined as
where m is the key ring size and P is the key pool size. Therefore, the probability that two nodes share at least one sub-key is defined by 1 p 0 .
Polynomial-based scheme
We briefly review the basic polynomial-based key pre-distribution protocol [9] . Because our goal is to establish pairwise keys, for simplicity, we only discuss the special case of pairwise key establishment in the context of sensor networks. To pre-distribute pairwise keys, a setup server randomly generates t -degree f .x; y/ over a finite field F q , where it has the symmetrical property of f .x; y/ D f .y; x/. The security proof in [9] ensures that this scheme is unconditionally secure and t -collusion resistant. That is, the collusion of no more than t compromised sensor nodes learns nothing about the pairwise key between any two non-compromised nodes. It is assumed that each sensor has a unique ID. For a sensor A, the setup server computes a polynomial share of f .x; ID A /. For any two sensor nodes A and B, node A can compute the common key f .ID B ; ID A / by evaluating f .x; ID A / at point ID B , and node B can compute the same key f .ID A ; ID B / D f .ID B ; ID A / by evaluating f .x; ID B / at point ID A . The sensor node A needs to store a t -degree polynomial f .x; ID A /.
As explained in [10] , the average probability that a link is indirectly compromised at generation j is given by
SELF-HEALING WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK PROTOCOLS
System and network assumptions: Time is divided into equal and fixed rounds. In RPoK and POLISH schemes, round synchronization can be implemented, but, in S-RKP, round synchronization is not necessary to be implemented in a node. The network is connected at all times. Any two sensors can communicate either directly or indirectly, via other sensors. In RPoK and POL-ISH, each sensor can perform cryptographic hashing and polynomial execution, but, in S-RKP, no sensor performs cryptographic hashing or polynomial execution (same as the RKP schemes).
Polynomial-based self-healing scheme
The primary aim of RPoK is to not only increase secure connectivity between nodes but also decrease the compromised ratio of nodes against node-capture attacks in multiphase WSNs. Practically, a private sub-key is not directly stored in each sensor node by applying the t -degree polynomial-based scheme to the RoK scheme [2] . As a result, an attacker has to capture .t C 1/ .ID A ; ID B / in their memory. In this way, all colluding local indices a; b; : : : ;´2 ¹1; 2; : : : m=2º are found, and the following becomes their pairwise symmetric key:
Note that f 
Simple random key pre-distribution scheme with self-healing
In order to attach self-healing property to the RKP scheme, all the previous RKP schemes with selfhealing property had to change the process of each sensor as well as that of a server. On the other hand, the primary aim of S-RKP is to attach self-healing property to the RKP scheme by simply changing only the server process. The S-RKP can attach self-healing property to existing RKP schemes by updating the key pool of a server with time. The most interesting point of this scheme is that processing of each sensor is the same as in the RKP scheme, that is, round synchronization is not necessary to be implemented in a node. We emphasize that the keys, which can be assigned to a sensor are not updated, same as the RKP scheme. Nevertheless, the keys have a limited lifetime, similar to the RoK scheme. S-RKP takes a different approach from the RoK scheme. Thanks to such a server process in the self-healing RKP, a sensor does not use even lightweight operations such as a hash function.
Protocol description.
This protocol is quite simple. Some additional executions by a server are required, while no additional execution on a node is necessary. The procedure on each sensor is the same as in the RKP scheme. The key pool in the RKP scheme is composed of random keys that do not evolve with time. In contrast, the key pool is composed of random keys that the server evolves with time in S-RKP.
Pool generation.
A server sets the key pool in this protocol. In order to generate the key pool, the server uses a hash chain using a cryptographic hash function H and a seed s. The key pool is initiated with P random sub-keys. Let k r be the`th key at round r in the key pool. A server computes the sub-keys k 
where k
, : : :, k
Because the key pool slides just ı at every round, all the keys in the key pool are replaced after dP =ıe rounds. A server manages the current P sub-keys in the key pool. The server discards the old sub-keys. 3. Ring assignment. This step is the same as ring assignment in the RKP scheme. For each sensor, m keys are randomly selected from the current key pool and stored in the sensor's memory before deployment. This set of m keys is called the sensor's key ring. 4. Establishing a secure link. This step is also the same as the establishment of a secure link in the RKP scheme. After the sensors are deployed, s i initiates key-discovery procedure with their neighbors with whom they share a key. Sensors, which discover that they contain a shared key in their key rings can then verify that their neighbors actually hold the key through a challenge-response protocol. Of course, this protocol can use 'path keys', as used in the RKP scheme.
Example
This section illustrates our protocol with an example (Figure 2 ). Let .P; m; ı; s/ D .5; 3; 1; 7/ and also let D ¹1; 2; : : : ; 100º be the key space. We assume that three sensors ¹s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 º are deployed at the beginning of round 0 and that s 3 is replaced at the beginning of round 2. At the first round 0, the key pool is initiated with KP 0 D ¹41; 
Proactive co-operative link self-healing scheme
To evaluate the healing rate of secret key for data encryption, the POSH scheme analyzes the number of green sensors in any round. The secret key K r i is used as a secure link between a sensor s i and the sink at round r because the sink knows all the secret keys of sensors. However, we cannot directly achieve the secure link between sensors by the POSH scheme, because the security of a link between sensors is not considered in the POSH scheme.
In this section, we describe the POLISH scheme. The primary aim of this scheme is to decrease the compromised ratio of links against node-capture attacks without help of a server, that is, links compromised in WSNs automatically self-heal with time. POLISH updates a link using the random data transmitted from the neighboring sensors, based on the idea of the POSH scheme. Although this protocol is very simple like POSH, more importantly, our security evaluation is not achieved easily, that is, it is necessary to newly take the security of a link between sensors into consideration in POLISH because such security is not considered in the POSH scheme.
A link self-heals in two steps: first two neighboring sensors are self-healed, and then the link between these sensors is self-healed. A major difference between POSH and POLISH is the security analysis of a link. While the POSH scheme in a sense treats the secure link between a sensor and a powerful sink, POLISH treats the secure link between sensors. In addition, POLISH uses a bivariate t -degree polynomial, and thus an attacker has to capture .t C 1/ polynomial shares during a limited period of time (i.e., at round 1) in order to corrupt a link.
An adversary breaks into c D jR r j sensors to read the pairwise symmetric keys and secret seeds of a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) in R r and to monitor all the communication of R r . At any time, we identify three sets of sensors (i.e., green, yellow, and red) and two sets of links as follows:
Red links (RL r ) are those that have been compromised in some round r 0 < r, and the pairwise symmetric key of the link is known to adversary in round r. Green links (GL r ) are those that have either never been compromised or regained their security in round r.
Note that, in this scheme, a red sensor s i at round r means that adversary knows a seed S r i . If s i becomes red in round r 0 and is self-healed at the end of round r > r 0 , then adversary can compute the contributions of s i from round r 0 to r.
Protocol description.
The protocol details of POLISH are as follows:
1. Setup. To pre-distribute pairwise keys, the setup server randomly generates a bivariate t -degree polynomial f .x; y/ over a finite field F q , such that it has the property of f .x; y/ D f .y; x/. For each sensor s i , the setup server computes a polynomial share of f .x; y/, that is, f .x; ID i /. Each sensor can use a secure hash function, a polynomial, and a PRNG with a unique secret seed. Note that the secure degree t of polynomial is dependent on the number of adversary at each round. For instance, if we set t > 10 as the secure degree of polynomial when we assume c D 10 then adversary cannot recover f .x; y/. 2. Establishing a secure link. For any two sensors s i and s j , the sensor s i can compute the key f .ID j ; ID i / by evaluating f .x; ID i /, and the sensor s j can compute the same key f .ID i ; ID j / D f .ID j ; ID i / by evaluating f .x; ID j /. As a result, sensors s i and s j can establish a pairwise symmetric key K (secure link) when they are deployed at the beginning of the first round (round 1). At the beginning of round r, s i produces w pseudo-random values (contributions) using its PRNG for w neighboring sensors and sends them to the neighboring sensors using a secure link. Note that all the contributions that s i sends are different. Then, each sensor receives contributions from the neighboring sensors during round r. The recipient uses two contributions as inputs to the secure hash function used for key update. To update the secure link at the end of round r, s i computes
Remark
In the POSH scheme, each sensor receives contributions from sensors, which are randomly chosen in WSNs. On the other hand, in POLISH, each sensor receives contributions from neighboring sensors. The probability that a contribution will be intercepted on the way by an adversary may become high in the POSH scheme, because a contribution can be sent from a sensor, which is far from the recipient.
The link state.
A link self-heals in two steps: first two neighboring sensors are selfhealed, and then the link between them is self-healed. We can generate the seven kinds of link states as described in Figure 3 4. Single-contributed condition means that either of two neighboring sensors receives at least one 'secure contribution'. 5. Double-contributed condition means that both of two neighboring sensors receive at least one secure contribution.
Note that the secure contribution is a green contribution that is not intercepted by adversary. A red link remains red if a red sensor is within the wireless communication range of both of two sensors, which constitute the red link. On the other hand, a green link remains green as long as both of two sensors, which constitute the green link are green. We notice that even if two sensors are green, the link between them can be also red (i.e., G(R) 
SECURITY EVALUATION BY ANALYTICAL MODEL
Secure connectivity
It is important to raise the secure connectivity, under strengthening resiliency. The higher the secure connectivity is, the better the self-healing scheme is. A self-healing scheme can be divided into two schemes, a deterministic and probabilistic key-sharing schemes. In this paper, POL-ISH is a deterministic key-sharing scheme, but RPoK and S-RKP are probabilistic key-sharing scheme. In a probabilistic key-sharing scheme, there is a tradeoff between secure connectivity and resiliency against node-capture attacks. RPoK and S-RKP establish 'almost certain' shared-key connectivity.
RPoK:
The secure connectivity of RPoK is the same as that of the original RKP [1] , that is, the probability that two nodes share i sub-keys is the same as Equation (1) as follows:
The probability that two nodes share at least one sub-key is defined by 1 p 0;RP oK .
S-RKP:
The secure connectivity of S-RKP is a little inferior to that of the original RKP, RoK, and RPoK because of the pool update. However, S-RKP can achieve secure key sharing without using the security executions. The ı sub-keys in the key pool are updated at every round as described in Section 3.2. Let KP r 1 Cr be the key pool after r rounds from the key pool KP r 1 (r is a positive number). Hence, KP r 1 KP r 1 \ KP r 1 Cr D ır holds. We assume that a node A is deployed at round r 1 , and then a node B is deployed after r rounds (refer to Figure 4) . r means the difference in rounds between two deployments of nodes A and B. Note that the key rings of nodes A and B are randomly selected from KP r 1 and KP r 1 Cr , respectively. The p .i;r/ is defined as the average probability that the nodes A and B share i sub-keys when the difference in rounds is r. If nodes A and B are deployed at the same round (i.e., r D 0), the probability that two nodes share i sub-keys is the same as in Equation (1), defined by
If r > 1, then p .i;r/ can be considered using Figure 4 as follows: The number of combination, which assigns sub-keys to nodes A and B is P m 2 because jKP r 1 j DˇKP r 1 CrˇD P . Also, the number of combination of common i sub-keys from a set of .P ır/ is P ır i . Here, we focus on assignment of the key ring of node A. Let x be the number of sub-keys of node A assigned from a set of (P ır i) in KP r 1 , that is, x is the number of sub-keys of node A, which does not overlap with sub-keys of node B in KP r 1 \ KP r 1 Cr . Hence, the number of combination, which assigns sub-keys to the node A (excluding i sub-keys) from a set of (P ır i) in KP r 1 is P ır i
x . Also, the number of combination, which assigns sub-keys to node A (excluding i and x sub-keys) from ır is ır m i x . Furthermore, the number of combination, which assigns the rest of sub-keys of KP r 1 Cr to node B (excluding i sub-keys) is P i x m i . Based on the previous details, the following equation is obtained by taking x into consideration from 0 to m i:
where . a b / D 0 when a < b or b < 0. p .i;r/ (Equation (9)) should be an extension of p .i;0/ (Equation (8)). The following theorem shows that p .i;r/ is an extension of p .i;0/ : Theorem 1 p .i;r/ is defined for all r > 0 as follows:
Proof p .i;r/ is defined when r > 1 in Equation (9) . So, we show that p .i;r/ satisfies Equation (8) . By estimating an appropriate r, we can derive p i;S RKP , which is the expected value of keysharing probability based on p .i;r/ . We assume that node A is newly deployed at round r 2 and that the neighboring nodes of node A were deployed at round r 1 on an average (r 1 < r 2 ). p i;S RKP of node A is related to the difference in rounds between node A and its neighboring nodes. Therefore, p i;S RKP is defined by
When an arbitrary node in WSNs is taken up, the average age (generation) of a node is estimated as EOE˛ in [2] § . When the newly deployed node shares sub-keys with existing neighboring nodes, EOE˛ is equivalent to the difference r 2 r 1 . While the age of node A is 0, the average age of existing neighboring nodes is EOE˛. Therefore, p i;S RKP is defined using EOE˛ as follows: 
POLISH:
In a deterministic key-sharing scheme, POLISH has an advantage that the probability of establishing a secure link is 100%, because a sensor s i has a polynomial f .x; ID i / and also shares the pairwise symmetric key K r i;j D f .ID j ; ID i / with s j in the first round (round 1). After that the pairwise symmetric key of each link is updated, and hence the secure connectivity is 100% at every round.
Resiliency
The degree of self-healing is measured by resiliency. Resiliency is estimated by the ratio of links that has not been compromised by the capture of nodes.
RPoK:
We can measure the resiliency by the following analytical model in [7] . We obtain the analytical model by combining P RoK [2] with the polynomial-based scheme [10] , in order to dramatically improve resiliency (i.e., the ratio of compromised links). The ratio P RP oK at generation j in RPoK is defined by § How to derive EOE˛ is shown in [2] . For instance, EOE˛ D 2:5 when .P; m/ D .10000; 250/. We use this EOE˛ in this paper. DOI: 10.1002/cpe SELF-HEALING WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS Figure 6 shows a comparison of the analytical result (P RP oK ) with simulation result (R S ) (t D 2) [7] in RPoK. We found that the resiliency .1 R RP oK / D 99:4% by Figure 6 holds, where E 0 c D 3 and c D 10. We see that the resiliency is much higher than other two schemes by Table II . S-RKP: We can measure the resiliency by the following analytical model in [15] . The idea of modeling the RoK scheme is to replace the generation j by the constant value. We evaluate this scheme employing the modeling method of RoK, that is, we estimate a constant value and replace it by j . Then, the ratio P S-RKP in [15] is defined by
where E 00 c D P =2ı. We can easily confirm that Equation (15) is the extended form of P RoK by [7] . Figure 6 shows a comparison of the analytical result (P S RKP ) with simulation result (R S ) [15] in S-RKP. We found that the resiliency .1 P S RKP / D 82:3% by Figure 6 holds when ı D 100. This means that S-RKP can achieve resiliency without using the security executions. POLISH: Unlike the POSH scheme, a sensor in POLISH receives contributions from neighboring sensors, that is, a sensor receives w contributions. Note that the state transition of a sensor is the same as in the POSH scheme. In POLISH, it is necessary to consider the contributions RPok, polynomial-based self-healing scheme; S-RKP, simple random key pre-distribution scheme with self-healing; POLISH, proactive co-operative link self-healing; PRF, Pseudo Random Function. from two-hop neighboring sensors. The contributions from neighboring sensors may be eavesdropped on by two-hop neighboring sensors. In this case, a green sensor is not self-healed even if it obtains a contribution from a green sensor. Let 1 .1 p R r / w 1 Á be the probability that at least one sensor of two-hop neighboring sensors is red, that is, the probability that a green sensor's contribution is eavesdropped on by an adversary (i.e., red sensor), which is within the wireless communication range of the green sensor. To become a green sensor (from yellow), the yellow sensor needs to be linked with at least one green sensor among neighboring sensors, and also a red sensor must not be within the wireless communication range of that green sensor. Thus, the probability of a yellow sensor not becoming green can be expressed as follows:
where
. The expected number of green sensors at round r is the same as in the POSH scheme as follows ¶ :
To evaluate the link-healing rate of POLISH, we analyze the number of green links by evaluating the state of sensors in any round, that is, the number of G(G)G in Figure 5 . The partial state transition diagram of a link is shown in Figure 5 , in which only the transition required to analyze the number of green links is depicted. That is, we consider only the input and the output of G(G)G and G(R)G. Let˛1,˛2,ˇ, 1 , 2 , and 3 be the number of link state transition (use not probability but a number.) and let RL r G.R/G RL r be a set of the link state G(R)G. This figure shows that the expected number of green links in round r is
1 is the number of green links between two green sensors changed from RL r G.R/G
. This transition occurs if neither of the green sensors is linked with a red sensor. Let p˛2 be the probability that a sensor needs to be linked with at least one green sensor of the neighboring sensors, and also that a red sensor must not be within the wireless communication range of that green sensor.˛2 is the number of green links between two green sensors, changed from red links between a green sensor and a yellow sensor. Let pˇbe the probability that at least one green sensor in GL r is corrupted.
SECURITY EVALUATION BY SIMULATION
We evaluate the ratio of links compromised by eager attackers to show the improvement of resiliency in our schemes. For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, we assume that the rounds of node compromising have the same duration. The ratio of compromised links is defined as
We follow the RoK scheme [2] regarding parameters and network. To simplify the security analysis, we model the network as a grid of sensors of size n D 400 (20 20). We assume that the number of neighbors of each sensor is constant and equal to four. This type of network topology is a mesh network. We also assume that the network topology does not change over time. The simulations are implemented in C. We set the parameters of RPoK and S-RKP to establish 'almost certain' shared-key connectivity.
Polynomial-based self-healing scheme and simple random key pre-distribution scheme with self-healing
Polynomial-based self-healing scheme and S-RKP are probabilistic key-sharing schemes with self-healing.
Simulation setup:
Parameters: The maximum life of a sensor is set to 100 rounds (i.e., Gw D 10 generations), which is the same parameter as [2] . In RPoK, P and m are decided not only by the degree t but also by the secure connectivity. When we consider the relation between P and m under the condition p i;RP oK , p i;S-RKP > 0:998, we can set .P; m/ D .1660; 100/ for t D 2 and .P; m/ D .1158; 83/ for t D 3 in RPoK and .P; m/ D .10000; 250/ in S-RKP, which are required to establish 'almost certain' sharedkey connectivity. We also set ı D 100 in the simulation of S-RKP. Note that the evaluation changing ı is conducted in Section 6. All the simulations were repeated 25 times, and the results report the average values. Network: We assume that one generation consists of 10 rounds (r D 10) and that the attacker corrupts one active sensor at each round (c D 1). At each generation, expired nodes are replaced with new ones, configured with fresh keys. The new nodes establish secure links with their four neighbors using session keys. More importantly, a round synchronization is not necessary for S-RKP, although it is necessary for RPoK.
Simulation details:
We evaluate the security of RPoK and S-RKP by the number of links that becomes indirectly corrupted when the nodes are compromised. A link, between nodes A and B, is said to be indirectly corrupted when neither A nor B has been corrupted, but when the adversary has collected all the sub-keys that A and B have in common. These sub-keys have been collected by compromising other nodes. At the beginning of round 0, n nodes are deployed. We simulated nodes, expiration by assigning to each node a random expiration date, chosen according to a Gaussian distribution with mean Gw=2 and with standard deviation Gw=6 [2] . Thus, sub-keys have limited lifetimes (i.e., the mean life is five generations (50 rounds)) and are refreshed periodically.
The attacker may create a table of keys that belongs to various rounds. He corrupts one active node at each round and updates such a table. He then uses this table to corrupt links. We counted, at each generation, the number of compromised links and computed the ratio R S . An attacker does not capture a node, which has already been corrupted to deal with the most serious situation, because he has all secret information of corrupted sensors. Simulation results: Figures 6 and 7 display the ratio R S of RPoK and S-RKP against an eager attacker, respectively. The R S of RPoK and S-RKP is suppressed to about 0.0081 (t D 2) and 0.214, respectively. These results show that our schemes have self-healing property and that they also hold both forward and backward security. The fluctuation of R S indicates probabilistic forward and backward security. We found that our analytical results well matched the simulation results of RPoK and S-RKP.
Proactive co-operative link self-healing
Proactive co-operative link self-healing is a deterministic key-sharing scheme with self-healing. We evaluate the ratio of red links against eager attackers to show the resiliency of POLISH. For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, we assume that each round when sensors are compromised has the same duration and is synchronized.
Simulation setup: All the simulations are repeated 25 times, and the results show the average values. Simulation details: We evaluate the security of POLISH by the number of red links when an adversary can compromise c sensors from the set G r in any round. At the first round (round 1), n green sensors are deployed. An eager attacker keeps compromising sensors at constant rate from the deployment of the first round of sensors to the end of the network. We then counted, in each round, the number of red links and computed the ratio. With the eager attacker, we ran the simulation until (1) the WSN has no more green sensors or (2) jR r j reaches a steady state. Simulation results: Figure 8 displays the ratio of red links against eager attackers. The ratio of red links is suppressed to 5:1% with c D 5, 10% with c D 10, 52% with c D 50, and 100% with c D 100, depicted in Figure 8 . We found that our analytical results well matched the simulation results of POLISH.
6. DISCUSSION
Analysis of simple random key pre-distribution scheme with self-healing
There is typically a tradeoff between secure connectivity and resiliency against node-capture attacks in the probabilistic key-sharing schemes. It is desirable that both values are high. Fortunately, the tradeoff is hardly appeared in S-RKP. ı can be set in such a way that it gives the maximum resiliency without spoiling secure connectivity. Figure 9 shows the changes of secure connectivity and resiliency when changing ı. The resiliency is derived using 1 P S-RKP and then has the maximum value as described in this figure. For example, the ı, which makes the resiliency maximum is 180 in Figure 9 . Figure 10 represents ı, which makes the resiliency maximum when 2 6 Gw 6 20. Note that Gw means the maximum lifespan of a sensor. We can determine the renewal ratio ı according to Gw from the viewpoint of self-healing. 
Comparison simple random key pre-distribution scheme with self-healing with RoK
The RoK scheme was the first resilient multiphase WSN scheme with self-healing property and was the most efficient. On the other hand, S-RKP is an efficient and resilient multiphase WSN scheme with self-healing property. The goal of this section is to evaluate secure connectivity and resiliency in S-RKP and compare them with the RoK scheme. The 'almost certain' shared-key connectivity is assumed. We compare S-RKP with the RoK scheme, following a similar simulation procedure as in [2] . When the length of each ring is m, the total number of sub-keys of RoK is just 2m. Thus, when the size of the key ring of S-RKP is m, we set m 2 as the length of a ring for the RoK scheme, from the standpoint of fairness. More concretely, m D 250 for S-RKP and m D 125 for the RoK scheme are set in this comparison. Also, we employ Gw D 10, which is the same as the parameter in [2] .
At first, we compare the secure connectivity of S-RKP with that of the RoK scheme. We set P so that the secure connectivity of S-RKP (ı D 0) becomes the same as that of the RoK scheme. The secure connectivity of the RoK scheme and S-RKP (ı D 0) is the same (i.e., p i;S-RKP D 99:8%). Actually, we can derive P from Equation (1) so that the secure connectivity of the RoK scheme is p i D 99:8%, that is, we obtain the adjusted parameters .P; m/ D .2562; 125/. While the secure connectivity is constant (p i D 99:8%) in the RoK scheme, the secure connectivity changes by renewal ratio ı in S-RKP. Hence, as ı becomes larger, secure connectivity decreases slightly smaller in S-RKP. Figure 11 shows the transition of secure connectivity of the RoK scheme and of S-RKP and also shows that secure connectivity is maintained highly in S-RKP. Remark: In the RoK scheme, each node updates its key ring. Thanks to this mechanism, the secure connectivity of the RoK scheme does not decrease, even if the updating ratio of the key pool changes. On the contrary, each node does not update its key ring in S-RKP.
Then, we compare the resiliency of S-RKP with that of the RoK scheme. More precisely, we compare P S-RKP with P RoK by the same parameter as in the case of the secure connectivity. Figure 12 shows the ratio of compromised links of the RoK scheme and S-RKP (ı D 100), where P RoK denotes the ratio of compromised links against eager attackers. Concretely, p i;S-RKP D 99:2% and P S-RKP D 0:177 hold when ı D 100. Note that p i;S-RKP is decreased from 0.998 to 0.992 when ı increases from 0 to 100. Actually, the stable point of the ratio of compromised links varies by changing ı in S-RKP, and it is thus necessary to evaluate the ratio of compromised links by changing ı. Figure 13 shows the transition of the stable point of the ratio of compromised links by changing ı in Equation (15) . When ı > 87, the ratio of compromised links of S-RKP becomes lower than that of the RoK scheme. Of course, ı < P holds. Furthermore, P S-RKP has a minimum value in ı > 87. S-RKP achieves resilient multiphase WSNs without even lightweight operations such as a hash function, although secure connectivity decreases a little. Table II shows the comparison of three self-healing schemes for WSNs from the viewpoint of security computation and procedure overhead that sensor/server execute. Figure 14 also displays the resiliency of RPoK, S-RKP, and POLISH against eager attackers, whose graphs are the same as the graphs in Figures 6-8 . We set the parameters of RPoK and S-RKP to establish 'almost certain' shared-key connectivity (Note that secure connectivity of POLISH is 100%.). Secure connectivity and resiliency are the results of each analytical evaluation. Furthermore, the number of attackers is the same (i.e., c D 10) at each generation (note that we need to consider 'round' as 'generation' in POLISH.). Polynomial-based self-healing scheme can dramatically increase resiliency, and hence it is suitable for situations that require higher resiliency such as a more hostile area, compared with the other two schemes. On the other hand, S-RKP can enhance the RKP with self-healing property, without changing the functions of the sensors. Thus, S-RKP can increase resiliency under realistic assumptions because a sensor does not have the functions of security executions and round synchronization. This means that S-RKP is suitable for WSNs that use resource-poor sensors although resiliency is somewhat low, compared with the other two schemes. Note that secure connectivity of RPoK and S-RKP is not 100% because they are probabilistic key-sharing schemes.
Comparison of our schemes
Proactive co-operative link self-healing is suitable for the situations where 100% secure connectivity is required and the size of memory is quite efficient in POLISH, because it is a deterministic key-sharing scheme. Also, POLISH can keep higher resiliency without the help of a server, where the sensor operates independently. Hence, POLISH is suitable for WSNs where the key management is not necessary by a server. Table III shows the computational cost, the communication cost, and the size of memory in selfhealing schemes for WSNs. Let M and R be the multiple operation over a finite field F q and the PRNG operation, respectively and also let Á be the length of each key ring. Let jqj be the size of the sub-keys, contribution, ID, the output of hashing, and the coefficient of a polynomial.
Computational, communication, and memory costs
The computational cost of each sensor in a round is discussed here. The computational cost of RPoK is a little larger than the one of the RoK. As for the computational cost of link establishment, Figure 14 . Comparison of results of polynomial-based self-healing scheme (RPoK), simple random key pre-distribution scheme with self-healing (S-RKP) and proactive co-operative link self-healing (POLISH). Table III . Computational, communication, and memory costs of each sensor.
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